## Prepayment penalties provide

 additional cash flows and affect the borrower's prepayment behavior.
## Value of Prepayment Penalty Cash Flows for Subprime Mortgage Collateral

Over the past several years, the proportion of penalty-protected loans in subprime mortgage/home equity loan (HEL) deals has increased dramatically. Less than 20\% five years ago, loans carrying prepayment penalties now account for about $60 \%$ of RFC originations and about $80 \%$ of New Century, Ameriquest, and Long Beach originations. Figures for other issuers are similar.

The impact of prepayment penalties is twofold. (1) Upon prepayment of a loan before penalty expiration, penalties provide additional cash flows to the loan owner. These cash flows are sometimes made available to investors through excess cash flow bonds. (2) Penalties change the borrower's prepayment behavior, lowering speeds before penalty expiration relative to speeds on no-penalty loans, and increasing them sharply for a short time period immediately following the expiration of the penalty. The presence of penalties also generally lowers borrowers' sensitivity to interest rates in rate rallies, but increases the extension risk in selloffs. ${ }^{6}$

In this article, we focus on fixed-rate loans and address the following question:
What is the value of the prepayment penalty cash flow over the life of a loan, given a realistic prepayment pattern of a penalty-protected loan? In other words, what premium should a buyer of whole loans pay for a loan that has a prepayment penalty compared to one with no penalty?

We set up four different pass-throughs. All of them have a WALA of zero months, a WAM of 30 years, loan WACs of $10.75 \%$, a pass-through coupon of $8 \%$, average loan balances of $\$ 75,000$, and LTVs of $77 \%$. Other loan characteristics are assigned the averages for recent deals issued by a large subprime originator. The differences between the pass-throughs are in the prepayment penalty terms, which take on the

[^0]values of zero years (no penalty), two, three, and five years. The prepayment penalty amount is assumed to be six months' interest on $80 \%$ of original principal balance. ${ }^{8}{ }^{9}$

Two sets of calculations are done:
1 The no-penalty pass-through is priced at par, using the no-penalty prepayment model. The other pass-throughs are then priced at the same OAS, using the prepayment models appropriate for the penalty term. Differences in prices between the no-penalty pass-through and the penalty-protected pass-throughs give the value of the prepayment penalty cash flows.

2 All pass-throughs are priced at par, using the appropriate prepayment models, and the OASs are compared.

The results are shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20. Effect of Prepayment Penalty on Price and OAS of a Pass-Through

|  | No Penalty | 2-Yr Penalty | Diff. | 3-Yr. Penalty | Diff. | 5-Yr. Penalty | Diff. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OAS = 57 bp |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Price | \$100.0 | \$101.2 | \$1.2 | \$102.0 | \$2.0 | \$102.7 | \$2.7 |
| Price $=\$ 100$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| OAS | 57bp | 99bp | 42 bp | 126bp | 69bp | 148bp | 91 pp |

OAS calculated to the swap curve of August 17, 2000.
Source: Salomon Smith Barney.

The value of the penalty cash flows ranges from $\$ 1.2$ to $\$ 2.7$, increasing with the increasing penalty term. Even though the speeds of two-, three-, and five-year penalty loans are similar before penalty expiration (and significantly lower than speeds on no-penalty loans), the increase in the value of the penalty cash flows is not proportional to the increase in the term. This is primarily the result of higher discounting of penalty payments that occur at higher loan ages.

The increase in OASs with increasing penalty terms indicates that borrowers who take out penalty-protected loans may be expected to pay lower loan rates than borrowers with no-penalty loans. To yield the same OAS, given realistic prepayment patterns on no-penalty and penalty-protected loans, a borrower who takes out a loan with a two-year prepayment penalty could pay a coupon that is approximately 42bp lower than the coupon on a no-penalty loan. ${ }^{10}$ The differences are 69 bp and 91 bp , respectively, on three- and five-year penalty loans. Empirical evidence indicates that borrowers who take out penalty-protected loans generally do pay lower loan rates.

[^1]Figure 21. Percentage of ABS Floating-Rate and Fixed-Rate Issuance, Year to Date 1999-2000

|  | $\mathbf{1 9 9 9}$ | 2000 (YTD) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Floating-Rate | 49.7 | $\%$ |
| Fixed-Rate | 50.3 | $76.8 \%$ |

Source: Salomon Smith Barney.

Figure 22. Year-to-Date ABS Issuance by Sector, 1999-2000 (Dollars in Millions)

|  | $\mathbf{1 9 9 9}$ (YTD) | Percentage | $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ (YTD) | Percentage |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Auto/Vehicle Loans | $35,357.5$ | 26.1 | $\%$ | $41,487.0$ |
| Equipment Loans | $6,006.1$ | 4.4 | $5,172.7$ | 31.6 |
| Credit Cards | $27,578.0$ | 20.4 | 3.9 |  |
| Home Equity Loans | $46,352.6$ | 34.2 | $26,761.2$ | 20.4 |
| Manufactured Housing | $6,892.4$ | 5.1 | $6,790.1$ | 29.5 |
| Student Loans | $5,075.8$ | 3.7 | $10,586.5$ | 4.8 |
| Other | $8,143.1$ | 6.0 | $2,155.5$ | 8.1 |
| Total | $\mathbf{\$ 1 3 5 , 4 0 5 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\%$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 3 1 , 3 1 6 . 6}$ |

Source: Securities Data Corp.

## Figure 23. Representative Fixed-Rate ABS Secondary-Market Spreads to Interest Rate Swaps ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  |  | 18 Aug <br> Swap <br> Sprd | AAA |  |  |  |  | A |  |  |  |  | BBB |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 18 Aug <br> Sprd | Spread Changes Over |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 1-Year } \\ \text { SD of } \\ \text { 1-Wk } \\ \text { Sprd } \\ \text { Chgs } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 18 Aug Sprd | Spread Changes Over |  |  | 1-Year SD of 1-Wk Sprd Chgs | 18 Aug Sprd | Sprd Chg Over |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 1-Year } \\ \text { SD of } \\ \text { 1-Wk } \\ \text { Sprd } \\ \text { Chgs } \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | 1 Wk | 4 Wks | 52 Wks | 1 Wk |  |  | 4 Wks | 52 Wks | 1 Wk |  |  | 4 Wk |  |
| 2 Yr | Retail Auto |  | 71 | 6bp | Obp | -1bp | -14 | 3.5bp | 30bp | 4bp | 3bp | -15 | 3.8bp | 75bp | -1bp | Obp | NA |
|  | Credit Card |  | 4 | 0 | 1 | -16 | 2.9 | 28 | 4 | 3 | -17 | 3.4 | 68bp | 4bp | -2bp | NA |
|  | Equipment |  | 16 | 0 | -2 | NA | NA | 41 | 0 | -4 | NA | NA | 86bp | Obp | -4bp | NA |
|  | Stranded Assets |  | 7 | 0 | -6 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Home Equity |  | 45 | 10 | 6 | -35 | 4.6 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Man. Housing |  | 42 | 10 | 3 | -28 | 4.7 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 3 Yr | Retail Auto | 78 | 7 | 0 | -1 | -9 | 3.1 | 35 | 3 | 2 | -6 | 4.1 | 82bp | Obp | 2 bp | NA |
|  | Credit Card |  | 5 | 0 | 1 | -11 | 2.8 | 30 | 0 | 0 | -11 | 4.0 | 75bp | Obp | Obp | NA |
|  | Equipment |  | 22 | 0 | -2 | NA | NA | 56 | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | 101bp | Obp | Obp | NA |
|  | Stranded Assets |  | 8 | -1 | -9 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Home Equity |  | 56 | 9 | 4 | -26 | 4.0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Man. Housing |  | 54 | 10 | 4 | -18 | 4.7 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 5 Yr | Credit Card | 91 | 8 | 1 | 1 | -8 | 2.8 | 38 | -2 | -2 | -5 | 4.7 | 83bp | -2bp | -2bp | NA |
|  | Stranded Assets |  | 12 | -1 | -14 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Home Equity |  | 78 | 10 | -4 | -29 | 6.2 | 125 | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Man. Housing |  | 73 | 10 | -4 | -19 | 6.4 | 125 | 0 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 7 Yr | Credit Card | 106 | 13 | 0 | 1 | -13 | 3.5 | 48 | -2 | -2 | -5 | 4.5 | 98bp | -2bp | -2bp | NA |
|  | Stranded Assets |  | 18 | 0 | -18 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Home Equity |  | 90 | 0 | -15 | -38 | 7.9 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Man. Housing |  | 85 | 0 | -10 | -23 | 6.7 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 10Yr | Credit Card | 126 | 17 | 0 | 1 | -5 | 3.9 | 58 | -2 | -2 | 6 | 5.1 | 113bp | -2bp | -2bp | NA |
|  | Stranded Assets |  | 24 | 1 | -23 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Home Equity |  | 110 | 0 | -15 | -28 | 7.1 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
|  | Man. Housing |  | 100 | 0 | -15 | -28 | 6.3 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

[^2]| Figur | 24. Repres | tive F | ting | ate AB | Secon | Mark | iscoun | rgins | Over | ne-M | LIB |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | AAA |  |  |  | A |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 18 Aug | Sprea | Changes | Over | $\begin{gathered} \text { 1-Year } \\ \text { SD of } \\ \text { 1-Wk } \\ \text { Sprd } \end{gathered}$ | 18 Aug | Spread | Change | Over | 1-Year SD of 1-Wk Sprd | 18 Aug | Sprd C |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 1-Year } \\ \text { SD of } \\ \text { 1-Wk } \\ \text { Sprd } \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | Spread | 1 Wk | 4 Wks | 52 Wks | Chgs | Spread | 1 Wk | 4 Wks | 52 Wks | Chgs | Spread | 1 Wk | 4 Wk | Chgs |
| 2-Yr | Retail Auto | 8bp | Obp | Obp | -7bp | 0.8 | 26bp | Obp | -5bp | -5bp | 2.0 | 76 | Obp | 6 bp | NA |
|  | Credit Card | 6 |  | 0 | -9 | 0.7 | 25 | 0 | -1 | -10 | 1.7 | 70 | 0 | -5 | NA |
|  | Home Equity | 27 | 2 | 1 | -8 | 0.9 | 90 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13.1 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 3-Yr | Retail Auto | 12 | 0 | 0 | -5 | 0.8 | 34 | 0 | -2 | -6 | 1.8 | 78 | 0 | 0 | NA |
|  | Credit Card | 9 | 0 | 0 | -8 | 0.7 | 30 | 0 | 1 | -10 | 1.5 | 74 | 0 | 5 | NA |
|  | Home Equity | 28 | 2 | 0 | -12 | 0.9 | 95 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.3 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 5-Yr | Credit Card | 15 | 0 | 0 | -9 | 0.7 | 40 | 0 | 0 | -9 | 2.3 | 85 | 0 | 0 | NA |
|  | Home Equity | 33 | 2 | 1 | -12 | 1.3 | 100 | 0 | 0 | -5 | 2.7 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| $7-\mathrm{Yr}$ | Credit Card | 18 | 0 | 0 | -11 | 0.8 | 52 | 0 | 2 | -3 | 1.7 | 102 | 0 | 7 | NA |
| 10-Yr | Credit Card | 25 | 0 | 0 | -9 | 1.1 | 62 | 2 | 0 | -3 | 2.1 | 117 | 2 | 9 | $N A$ |

LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate. SD Standard deviation.
Source: Salomon Smith Barney.

## Figure 25. Recent Issuance

| Date | Issuer | Type | Class | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Size } \\ \text { (Mil.) } \end{array}$ | Credit <br> Enhancement | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WAL } \\ & \text { (Yrs) } \end{aligned}$ | Rating Moody's/S\&P | Spread |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 17 Aug 00 | Capital One 2000-3 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | CC | A | 807.50 | Sr./Mezz./Sub. | 6.98 | Aaa/AAA | 19/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | B | 92.50 |  | 6.98 | A2/A | 51/1M LIBOR |
| 17 Aug 00 | Fleet CCMT 20000-C | CC | A | 529.75 | Sr./Mezz./Sub. | 4.97 | Aaa/AAA | 10/5YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | B | 48.75 |  | 4.97 | A2/A | 39/1M LIBOR |
| 16 Aug 00 | Textron Financial Revbls Trust 2000-A | EL | A | 195.30 | Sr./Mezz./Sub. | 1.30 | Aaa/AAA | 25/EDSF |
|  | Textron Financial Rcvbls Trust 2000-A |  | B | 6.30 |  | 2.98 | A2/A+ | 75/3YR SWAPS |
| 16 Aug 00 | Advanta MLT 2000-2 | HE | A-2 | 54.60 | Wrapped By FSA | 2.00 | Aaa/AAA | 45/2YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-3 | 123.25 |  | 3.00 | Aaa/AAA | 67/3YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-4 | 83.10 |  | 5.00 | Aaa/AAA | 90/5YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-5 | 64.90 |  | 8.00 | Aaa/AAA | 123/8YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-6 | 65.00 |  | 6.39 | Aaa/AAA | 69/8YR SWAPS |
| 16 Aug 00 | Vanderbilt 2000-C | MH | A-A | 30.90 | Sr./Mezz./Sub. | 5.28 | Aaa/AAA | 35/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A-1 | 55.00 |  | 1.03 | Aaa/AAA | 12/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A-2 | 50.00 |  | 3.03 | Aaa/AAA | 120/5.75 8/03 |
|  |  |  | A-3 | 34.00 |  | 5.15 | Aaa/AAA | 150/5.88 11/05 |
|  |  |  | A-4 | 44.40 |  | 9.62 | Aaa/AAA | 205/6.50 2/10 |
|  |  |  | A-5 | 11.90 |  | 13.11 | Aa3/AA- | 235/6.50 2/10 |
|  |  |  | M-1 | 10.60 |  | 9.28 | A2/A | 275/6.50 2/10 |
|  |  |  | B-1 | 10.60 |  | 6.29 | Baa2/BBB | 360/6.25 2/07 |
|  |  |  | B-2 | 17.20 |  | 11.12 | Baa2/BBB | 410/6.50 2/10 |
| 16 Aug 00 | Dealer Auto Rcvbls Trust 2000-1 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | AL | A-1 | 190.00 | Sr./Mezz./Sub. | 0.23 | P-1/A-1+ | 0/3M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A-2 | 274.00 |  | 1.00 | Aaa/AAA | 15/SYNTH LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A. 3 | 168.00 |  | 2.00 | Aaa/AAA | 18/2YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-4 | 83.30 |  | 2.84 | Aaa/AAA | 22/3YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | B | 24.50 |  | 2.98 | A2/A | 57/3YR SWAPS |
| 15 Aug 00 | National City Credit Card Master Trust 2000-1 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | CC | A | 525.00 | Sr./Mezz./Sub. | 4.98 | Aaa/AAA | 15/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | B | 36.00 |  | 4.98 | A2/A | 40/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | C | 39.00 |  | 4.98 | BBB/BBB | 88/1M LIBOR |
| 11 Aug 00 | Advanta Business Card Master Trust 2000-8 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | AL | A | 480.00 |  | 2.90 | Aaa/AAA | 17/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | B | 57.00 |  | 2.90 | A2/A | 55/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | C | 42.00 |  | 2.90 | Baa2/BBB | 125/1M LIBOR |
| 10 Aug 00 | Providian MT 2000-2 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | CC | A | 450.00 | Sr./Mezz./Sub | 4.92 | Aaa/AAA | 17/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | B | 59.30 |  | 5.08 | A2/A | 51/1M LIBOR |
|  |  |  | C | 49.20 |  | 5.25 | Baa2/BBB | 114/INTERP SWAPS |
| 10 Aug 00 | MMCA 2000-1 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | AL | A-1 | 165.00 | Sr./Mezz./Sub | 0.31 | P-1/A-1+ | 1/SYNTH LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A-2 | 500.00 |  | 1.05 | Aaa/AAA | 15/SYNTH LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A. 3 | 490.00 |  | 2.10 | Aaa/AAA | 18/2YR SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-4 | 384.00 |  | 3.24 | Aaa/AAA | 25/3YR SWAPS |
| 8 Aug 00 | Americredit "00-C | AL | A-1 | 170.00 | Wrapped By FSA | 0.33 | Aaa/AAA | 0/SYNTH LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A-2 | 370.00 |  | 1.00 | Aaa/AAA | 15/SYNTH LIBOR |
|  |  |  | A-3 | 262.00 |  | 2.10 | Aaa/AAA | 20/SWAPS |
|  |  |  | A-4 | 298.00 |  | 3.37 | Aaa/AAA | 21/1M LIBOR |

[^3]
[^0]:    ${ }^{6}$ For a detailed description of prepayments on penalty-protected loans, see Prepayments on RFC Fixed-Rate Subprime/Home Equity Loans, I. Gjaja, Salomon Smith Barney, August 2000.
    ${ }^{7}$ In this article, we do not consider credit issues. The difference between the WAC on the loan and the coupon on the pass-through may be assumed to pay for servicing as well as for credit insurance to the holders of the pass-through.

[^1]:    ${ }^{8}$ This is the most common penalty for subprime loans.
    ${ }^{9}$ For simplicity, we assume that all prepayments before expiration of the penalty result in a payment of penalty. This is a slight overestimate, as defaulted loans generally do not pay a prepayment penalty.
    ${ }^{10}$ Changes in the coupon on the loan, and therefore on the coupon of the pass-through, are reflected in changes in the yield curve margin and therefore in the OASs. A change in the coupon is nearly exactly matched by the change in OAS.

[^2]:    ${ }^{a}$ As of April 14, spreads are quoted versus interest rate swaps. Historical spread data was converted into spreads to swaps in order to avoid distortions in historical comparisons.
    SD Standard Deviation. Source: Salomon Smith Barney.

[^3]:    ${ }^{\mathrm{a}}$ Salomon Smith Barney has acted as a manager and/or co-manager of debt issues of this issuer within the past three years.
    ABS Asset-backed securities. AD Auto dealer floor plan. AIR Airplane leases. AL Auto loan. ALE Automobile lease. BL Boat loan. CA Controlled amortization. CC Credit card. CCA Cash collateral account. CHC Charge card. CIA Collateral invested amount. CON Consumer loans. DF Dealer floor plan. EL Equipment loan. FEL Farm equipment loan. FF Fed funds. Whole first and second liens. FR Franchise loan. HE Home equity. HIL Home Improvement loan. MB Mortgage-backed. Mezz. Mezzanine. MH Manufactured housing. ML Motorcycle Loans. NA Not available. 0 Other. OC Overcollateralized. RIC Retail installment contracts. RV Recreational vehicle. BA Small business association loans. SL Student loan. TL Truck loan. Sub. Subordinate. UBA Utility bill allocations. WAL Weighted average life. WHL Wholesale inventory. WI When issued.
    Source: MCM "Corporatewatch."

